III. CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN, OVERTHROW OF PREMIER MOSSADEQ OF IRAN (CIA Secret Report)

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III.  CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN


      On the afternoon of 9 June all those who were to take

part in the discussions arrived in Beirut:  Mr. Kermit

Roosevelt, Chief NEA and project chief throughout the

operation, came in by plane from London; Carroll came

from Cyprus by plane; Roger Goiran, Chief of Station at

Tehran, drove on from Damascus by car; and Wilber came in

from Cairo by air.

     On the morning of 10 June the talks got underway and

continued for four days.  The usual schedule was to start

quite early, carry through until about two o'clock, and

then assemble again in the late afternoon.  The first order

of business was a reexamination of all the factors and ele-

ments of the political scene in Iran in the light of the

current and comprehensive information supplied by the

Tehran chief of station.  After all the basic principles

of the draft paln had been accepted, the attention of the

conferees turned to a section by section consideration of

the plan.  The object of the meetings was to determine how

each section could be given the maximum structure and im-

pact.  One switch in general outlook was made that was most

salutary for all later thinking.  The draft plan had implied

that definite counteraction would have to be taken against

some of the strongest elements supporting Mossadeq, such as


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the Qashqai tribal leaders; but it was now decided that

every effort should be devoted to increasing the size and

effectiveness of the anti-Mossadeq forces, the assumption

being that Mossadeq's supporting elements would not react

once their leader was out of the picture.

     The Tehran chief of station suggested that an alter-

native plan to provide for the overthrow of Mossadeq be

developed.  This was to become the Amini/Qashqai plan

which the station kept alive as a possible alternative

until the successful conclusion of TPAJAX.

     Saturday afternoon the group held its final meeting

and on the next morning, 14 June, departed by plane for

its several destinations.

     Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London on 15 June and

reported to the main offices of the SIS at 54 Broadway.

They turned over the Beirut revision of the plan.  No copy

of the original Beirut draft exists, since it was reworked

to form the final "London" draft.

     The London meetings were held in one of the conference

rooms at 54 Broadway, notable only for a large sign with

the legend in red, "Curb Your Guests."  For the SIS,

Commander Maurice M. Firth and Norman Darbyshire, who had

come on from Nicosia by way of Geneva (where he had seen

Asadollah Rashidian a second time before the latter went


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back to Iran) were always present. Upon occasion Major

P.(Paddy) J. Keen, whose post seemed to be that of desk

officer for several Middle East countries, also participated.

Montague Woodhouse, clearly one of their most highly esteemed

officers, attended a single meeting but had little to con-

tribute.

     From the moment the discussion began, it was clear that

the SIS had no major comments of their own on the draft plan.

Nor did they have much to say on the Beirut version beyond a

certain close attention to phraseology.  As at Nicosia it was

apparent that the Americans were to be placated and allowed

to run things as they pleased.  They did, however, seem to

have abundant confidence in the plan and in the successful

outcome of the operation, and said that the Rashidians would

be ordered to follow completely the orders of CIA's Tehran

Station.

     At the final meeting those present reviewed the future

conduct of affairs.  The SIS officers stated that they

thought it would take some time to obtain a firm decision

from their government as to the approval or non-approval

of the plan.

     Roosevelt and Wilber left London on 17 June, and

Roosevelt was back in his office by noon of the 18th.


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There the plan was immediately reconstructed and typed

up.  (It is given as Appendix B and it should be read

at this point in the chronological account of the 

operation.)










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